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CASE COMMENTS
MUNICIPALITIES AND THE DUTY TO CONSULT
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES: A CASE COMMENT ON
NESKONLITHINDINBAND VSALMONARM (CITY)
SHIN IMAI AND ASHLEY STACEY'

The duty to consult and accommodate has become one of the most
important principles of Canadian Aboriginal law. Since HaidaNation v
British Columbia (MinisterofForests),' the Supreme Court of Canada has
sought to clarify the boundaries of consultation in order to ensure that
developments affectingAboriginal rights proceed with a degree of certainty.
It is clear that the Crown bears the responsibility for consultation and a
failure to consult may result in overturning or staying decisions of the
Crown until consultation has taken place. Such consultation is grounded in
the honour of the Crown, which is a core constitutional principle
informing all interactions between Aboriginal peoples and
the government.2
In a recent decision, Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon Arm (City of)
("Neskonlith"), the British Columbia Court ofAppeal was asked to decide
whether the constitutional duty to consult could be imposed on a
municipality. The Court (per Newbury J.A.; Hall and Smith JJ.A.
concurring) noted that there were powerful arguments, "both legal and
t

Shin Imai, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Ashley Stacey, Student at Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [HaidaNation].
2
Ibid at para 16. See also Rio TintoAlcan Inc v CarrierSekani Tribal Council,2010 SCC
43 at para 32, [2010] 2 SCR 650 [Rio Tinto].
t

2012 BCCA 379, 354 DLR (4th) 696 [Neskonlith BCCA], aff'g 2012 BCSC 499,
[2012] 3 CNLR 196 [Neskonlith BCSC].
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practical", against inferring such a duty on the municipality.4 As the
municipality was not the Crown, and the municipality did not have an
obligation to consult, the planned project could go ahead. Presumably, the
Crown would still have the duty to consult. However, based on the Court's
reasoning, the the Neskonlith Indian Band was left to pursue the Crown's
failure to consult in some other forum, while the municipality was free to
proceed whether or not the Crown had fulfilled its duty to consult
and accommodate.
We argue that the Court ofAppeal asked the wrong question and came
to a result that is ultimately not supportable. In our view, the result of an
inquiry into who has the duty to consult does not also answer the question
about whether consultation is necessary before a project can proceed. These
are two separate questions. Irrespective ofwho must consult, this duty must
be met before proceeding with a project that actually or potentially
infringes Aboriginal rights.
In this commentary we first discuss the legal and practical implications
of the Court ofAppeal's decision. We then explore alternative possibilities:
imposing a duty to consult directly on a municipality, requiring the Crown
to fulfill the duty alone, or requiring municipalities to work with the
provincial Crown when consultation is required. Finally, Ontario's new
MiningAct regime is analyzed to provide a useful framework in which to
explore the latter solution.

I. CASE SUMMARY
In Neskonlith, the City of Salmon Arm authorized the construction of a
shopping mail on a flood plain. The project was so dangerous that a
hazardous-development permit was required pursuant to Part 26 of the
British Columbia Local Government Act.6 The Neskonlith First Nation
bordered on the development and sought to quash this permit, as they were
concerned with the damage that could result should there be a flood. The
First Nation argued that the municipality had a duty to consult. As the
provincial Crown had empowered municipalities to make land use
Ibid at para 66.
5

RSO 1990, cM.14.
RSBC 1996, c 323, Part 26 [LGA].
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decisions, this delegation ofpower must necessarily have been accompanied
by the delegation of the provincial duty to consult.
At the initial hearing before the British Columbia Supreme Court,
Leask J. reasoned that the duty to consult lay only with the Crown. As
municipalities were not the Crown, municipalities did not have such a duty.
Since the municipality had the authority to approve the construction of the
mall, construction couldcontinue.Justice Leaskconcluded: "[T]he honour
of the Crown is non-delegable and the final responsibility for consultation
rests at all times with the Crown. Procedural aspects of the duty to consult
can be delegated, but in order for the province to do so, the power must be
expressly or impliedly conferred by statute."'
The Court ofAppeal upheld LeaskJ's ruling, relying on two main cases
to reach its decision. In HaidaNation,where the issue was whether the duty
to consult lay with a forestry company, the Supreme Court of Canada said:
The Crown alone remains legally responsible for the consequences of its
actions and interactions with third parties, that affect Aboriginal interests.
The Crown may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry
proponents seeking a particular development.... However, the ultimate
legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the
Crown. The honour of the Crown cannot be delegated.'
In the second case relied on, Rio Tinto, the issue was not whether a
private developer had the duty to consult but whether a regulatory body or
tribunal had a duty to consult.' The Supreme Court of Canada held that a
legislature may delegate its duty to consult but in the absence of express or
implied authorization to do so, no such duty existed.
The power to engage in consultation itself, as distinct from the jurisdiction
to determine whether a duty to consult exists, cannot be inferred from the
mere power to consider questions of law. Consultation itself is not a
question of law; it is a distinct and often complex constitutional process
and, in certain circumstances, a right involving facts, law, policy, and
compromise. The tribunal seeking to engage in consultation itself must
therefore possess remedial powers necessary to do what it is asked to do in
7

s
9

Neskonlith BCSC, supra note 3 at para 46.
Haida Nation,supra note 1 at para 53.
Rio Tinto, supra note 2 at paras 1-2.
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connection with the consultation. The remedial powers of a tribunal will
depend on that tribunal's enabling statute, and will require discerning the
legislative intent[] 10
Based on HaidaNation and Rio Tinto, the Court of Appeal concluded
that municipalities lack the authority to engage in the complex
constitutional process to consult, as the Province had not expressly
delegated such powers.

II. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT
OF APPEAL'S DECISION
What the British Columbia Court ofAppeal took from HaidaNation and
Rio Tinto was that some bodies did not have the obligation to carry out
consultations. The consequence ofbeing freed of this constitutional burden
meant that there was no longer any constitutional requirement for that
body to consult. This approach, which focuses on the nature of the body
that is bound by constitutional obligations, is familiar in the analysis of the
applicability of the CharterofRights andFreedoms." The duty to comply
with the provisions of the Charterisrestricted to the federal and provincial
governments by section 32 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.2 Because private
individuals or non-government entities are not bound by the Charter,the
character of the entity that is engaging in the activity at issue will determine
whether the Charterhas any relevance. A private enterprise, for example,
will not be bound by the free-speech provisions of the Charter in its
treatment of its employees. If the Charterdoes not apply, then the entity
may carry on ignoring the restrictions that would have been imposed had
the Charterapplied.
While there is a widely held perception that Aboriginal rights are listed
in the Charter,in fact, this is incorrect. The rights in the Charterare set out
under Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982.13 Aboriginal peoples'rights are
10

12
1

Ibid atpara60.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK),
1982 c 11 [Charter].
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution].
Charter,supranote 11.
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set out in sections 35 and 35.1 in Part II, under the heading "Rights OfThe
Aboriginal Peoples Of Canada"."
Section 35 rights have a different character than Charterrights. The
Supreme Court of Canada in HaidaNation addressed fundamental issues
concerning the political make up of our nation, the recognition of inherent
Aboriginal rights, and the reconciliation ofAboriginal and non-Aboriginal
people. It is the Crown's sui generis fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal
people and the concept of the honour of the Crown that has led the
Supreme Court of Canada and subsequent courts to view the Crown as a
key player in consultation and accommodation." The basis for this finding
is largely rooted in the history of the Crown interposing itself in
relationships between individual settlers and Aboriginal people. This was
clearly articulated in the RoyalProclamationof] 763,"6 which prohibited
the transfer ofAboriginal lands directly to non-Aboriginal individuals and
required that land be surrendered to the Crown first. This policy was
instituted because individual settlers were causing havoc with relations
between the Crown and Aboriginal people:
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing
Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice ofour Interests, and to the great
Dissatisfaction of the said Indians; In order, therefore, to prevent such
Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may be
convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all
reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy
Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to
make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the
said Indians... "

14

Constitution, supranote

"

See HaidaNation,supranote 1, at paras 18-27 where the Court describes the Crown's
fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal people and the honour of the Crown as it relates to
consultation and reconciliation. See also Rio Tinto, supra note 2, at para 38 where the
Court talks about the "'generative'constitutional order 'which sees section 35 serving a
dynamic and not simply static function'".
RSC 1985,App II,No 1.

16

17

Ibid.

12, ss 35-35.1.
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Seen in this light, the objective of Haida Nation's insistence that the
Crown bear the responsibility for consultation was to continue the legal
and historical relationship between the Crown andAboriginal people. The
case meant to reinforce the notion that the Crown should not be able to
shed the responsibilities associated with the honour of the Crown by
delegating responsibilities to other parties. Haida Nation must be read
together with R v Sparrow," which permitted the Crown to infringe
Aboriginal rights guaranteed in section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.
Infringement could occur only by satisfying certain conditions dictated by
the honour of the Crown, including having a proper legislative objective,
infringing the right as little as possible, consultation, and, where
appropriate, compensation.
The corollary is that, unlike breaches of rights mentioned in the
Charter,Aboriginal rights under Part II do not provide for a sphere of
activity by non-government actors that is beyond the reach of
constitutional rights. Consequently, an analysis of the reach of the Charter
to non- government entities in cases such as RWDSUv Dolphin Delivery
Ltd,'9 is inappropriate for a section 35 analysis. The duty to consult that is
grounded in section 35 protects existing or asserted Aboriginal and treaty
rights that cannot be breached by government or by private actors. In other
words, HaidaNation was not meant to stand for the proposition that only
the Crown had the duty to consult and accommodate while other parties
were free to infringe existing or potential Aboriginal rights without
consulting, so long as they had legislative authority to proceed with
a project.
The Court of Appeal's decision in Neskonlith also creates difficult
implementation issues. While the Crown would continue to have the duty
to consult, it would not be able to prevent a municipality from proceeding
with a project. This is the case even if,during the consultation, the Crown
discovered that an alternative method would avoid infringement of an
existing or asserted Aboriginal right, or that accommodation of some type
would be appropriate. In this type of scenario, it would be understandable
that a First Nation would be frustrated as it watched a municipality proceed
18

[1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR(4th) 385.

'9

[1986]2SCR573,33DLR(4th) 174.
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with a project that was more intrusive than necessary, simply because the
municipality had no obligation to listen to the First Nation. This type of
situation would increase the possibilities of conflict rather than
encourage reconciliation.
Perhaps more significant is the possibility that the Court's reasoning
would extend to private parties such as resource extraction companies.
British Columbia has a free-entry system that permits exploration to take
place without any licence from the government. 20 Ontario used to have a
similar system, and under that system litigation ensued when a mining
company, Solid Gold, began exploratory activities in the territory of the
Wahgoshig First Nation. Solid Gold refused to consult with the First
Nation and argued that it was given direct authority under the Ontario
mining legislation to prospect and stake without consultation. 2 ' The
Superior Court found that Solid Gold had been delegated aspects of the
consultation by the Crown and that its failure to consult justified the
granting of an injunction to the First Nation. 22 However, based on the logic
articulated in Neskonlith, mining companies in British Columbia would be
able to explore without consulting, although the Crown would continue to
have a duty to consult. It is not hard to imagine that First Nations would be
troubled should a court permit exploration to take place, even if the Crown,
having consulted, came to the conclusion that some accommodation would
be appropriate.
20

A proponent need only obtain a Free Miner Certificate for a nominal fee (see Mineral
Tenure Regulations, BC Reg 529/2004, Schedule B) and must be over 18 years of age
and ordinarily resident or working in Canada, a corporation, or a partnership (Mineral
Tenure Act, RSBC 1996, c 292, ss 7, 8(2), 11(1)). Claims are staked online at BC's
Mineral Titles Online website (Mineral Titles Online, online: British Columbia
<https://www.mtonline.gov.bc.ca/mtov/home.do>) by paying a registration fee.
Thereafter, the proponent acquires rights to the minerals in the ground (MineralTenure
Act, RSBC 1996, c 292, ss 14(1), 28).

21

Wahgoshig FirstNation v Ontario, 2011 ONSC 7708 at para 23, 108 OR (3d) 647
[Wahgoshig]. Leave to appeal was granted by Wilton-SiegelJ. in WahgoshigFirstNation
v Ontario,2012 ONSC 2323, 112 OR (3d) 782 on the basis that Solid Gold may not
have had a duty to consult and consequently may have been justified in carrying on the
exploration activities. See Aston J.'s oral reasoning for rendering the appeal moot in
WahgoshigFirstNation v Solid Gold Resources, 2013 ONSC 632,74 CELR (3d) 8.

2

Wahgoshig,supra note 21 at paras 57-58.
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It is interesting that three judges of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, sitting as the Court ofAppeal ofYukon, supported a different logic
than their fellow judges in the Neskonlith case. In Ross RiverDena Councilv
Yukon, the Court (per Groberman J.A.; Tysoe and Hinkson JJ.A.
concurring) rejected the Crown's argument that it had no duty to consult
and, by extension, mining companies had no duty to consult underYukon's
free-entry mining exploration system." Under that system, anyone can
record a mining claim and there is no provision for the Yukon government
to refuse to record, or to license the subsequent exploration activity for
Class 1 exploration. The Court ofAppeal found this statutory scheme to be
unconstitutional and declared that the Government of the Yukon had a
duty to notify and where appropriate consult and accommodate the Ross
River Dene before allowing Class 1 mining exploration that could
prejudicially affect Aboriginal rights.24
In sum, whether or not a project should proceed should not be decided
by whether a particular entity or business has the duty to consult. Rather,
the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that the constitutionally
permissible manner in which to affect asserted Aboriginal interest in the
land is through the mechanism of consultation by the Crown. If the Crown
has failed to consult, then the precondition for taking actions that affect the
Aboriginal interest has not been met. The fact that a municipality or a
private business does not have the duty to consult does not put them in a
better position than the Crown.

23

Ross RiverDena Council v Yukon, 2012 YKCA 14 at para 56,358 DLR (4th) 100; leave
to appeal dismissed in [2013] SCCA no 106 [Ross RiverDena]. The Court ofAppeal
decision was left intact and remains the law ofYukon.

24

Ibid,at para 37: "The duty to consult exists to ensure that the Crown does not manage
its resources in a manner that ignores Aboriginal claims. It is a mechanism by which the

claims of First Nations can be reconciled with the Crown's right to manage resources.
Statutory regimes that do not allow for consultation and fail to provide any other
equally effective means to acknowledge and accommodate Aboriginal claims are
defective and cannot be allowed to subsist" (emphasis added). The rationale is that
legislative schemes cannot modify the Crown's constitutional duty to consult and
accommodate. Legislative schemes that do so are contrary to the constitutional duty to
consult and thus can be considered unconstitutional.
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FILLING THE VACUUM: WHICH PARTIES SHOULD BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSULTATION?
We have argued that the duty to consult must be fulfilled by someone
before a project affecting Aboriginal rights proceeds. One possibility is to
make the municipality that provides approvals for the project directly
responsible for fulfilling the duty to consult. Alternatively, the duty to
consult could remain entirely with the Crown. However, as we explain
below, neither of these solutions would suffice. In our view, municipalities
should be required to work with the provincial Crown, as both parties
would have important roles to play in the consultation process.
A.

SHOULD THE DUTY TO CONSULT BE DIRECTLY IMPOSED ON A
MUNICIPALITY?

One solution would be to require municipalities or other non-Crown
parties to consult with Aboriginal peoples. This could be accomplished
either by having the Crown delegate all ofits consultation responsibilities to
a third party or by having the Court impose consultation responsibilities
directly on third parties. We do not believe that Haida Nation, nor any
subsequent case, supports wholesale delegation. HaidaNation only talks
about delegating "procedural aspects" to third parties.2 1
While there are strong legal arguments against this approach, the
practical arguments are even stronger. If each municipality had to decide on
how to consult and accommodate, they would not have the benefit of a
central source, like a ministry ofAboriginal affairs, that could accumulate
knowledge and experience in consultation. The duty to consult and
accommodate could be a significant resource drain for smaller
municipalities if deep consultation were required. Further, the consultation
might result in the need for some accommodation that could fall under
provincial jurisdiction, creating difficulties in implementation. This process
would be inefficient and place burdens on both municipalities that had the
capacity to consult and those that did not.
If the duty to consult and accommodate were also completely delegated
to private enterprises such as mining companies, there would be a

25

HaidaNation, supra note 1 at para 53.
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patchwork of practices and accommodations that would not benefit from
the governments' overall supervision and monitoring. It could lead to a
situation described in the RoyalProclamationofl763,quoted above, where
"Frauds andAbuses [are] committed in purchasingLands of the Indians, to
the great Prejudice of our Interests"26
B.

SHOULD "THE CROWN" BE RESPONSIBLE FORALL

CONSULTATION AND ACCOMMODATION?

One suggestion that has been raised informally in some circles is the idea
that all consultation should remain with the Crown in order to preserve
nation-to-nation relationships with First Nations. This solution is seen as a
way of avoiding the myriad of government agencies, private companies,
municipalities, and ministries that can become involved in projects.
We do not see this as an efficient solution. There would have to be a
central office, such as a ministry ofAboriginal affairs, that would conduct
all the consultations and implement accommodations. While such a
ministry can be a repository for skills and knowledge, it cannot become an
expert in all areas of potential activity. By necessity, the ministry would have
to defer to the entity that is the actual project proponent for expertise, or
gain the cooperation of a particular government ministry that would carry
out the accommodation. Therefore, the variety of entities involved would
not be eliminated. This solution would only provide a bureaucratic overlay
that may lead to more opaque processes, as opposed to providing
transparency. In fact, in our view, it would be better to have First Nations
speak to the project proponents or decision makers directly, instead of
through a government department.
C. THE CASE FOR PROVINCIAL CROWNS AND MUNICIPALITIES OR
THIRD PARTIES WORKING TOGETHER ON CONSULTATION

The position that we feel is most consistent with the Constitution and with
Haida Nation, is to have the Crown retain primary responsibility for
consultation and accommodation but delegate parts of the process that are
appropriate to the municipalities. Practically speaking, the delegation of
parts of the responsibility makes sense since local governments are in the
26

Royal Proclamationof1763, supra note 16.
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best position to be able to assess the effects that a decision will have on a
First Nation. The Neskonlith Indian Band argued this position. The
relevant excerpt from their factum states:
Local governments, as the decision-makers regarding land use decisions
that could affect the exercise ofAboriginal Title and Rights, are in the best
position to engage in the consultation process. They are located in the area
where the proposed development is proposed to take place and have a
better
understanding
of the
local
circumstances
than
centralized governments. 7
On the other hand, keeping primary responsibility with the provincial
Crown would permit the centralization of expertise, knowledge, and
resources that could be used to assess the strength of the claim and provide
supportive resources to the consultation process.
While this last solution seems like an obvious compromise, Newbury
J.A. seemed concerned about municipalities' capacity to undertake
consultation, as well as the possibility that imposing such a duty would
create endless litigation. We explore both concerns.
1.

Do MUNICIPALITIES HAVE THE CAPACITY TO CONSULT?

Justice Newbury questioned whether a municipality has the necessary
infrastructure to actually conduct a consultation:
I also suggest that despite the aspirational wording of s. 1 of the
Community Charter noted earlier, municipal governments lack the
practical resources to consult and accommodate. Such governments (of
which there are 191 in British Columbia) range greatly in size and tax-base,
and are generally concerned with the regulation of privately-owned land
and activities thereon. Crown land and natural resources found thereon
remain within the purview of the Province. It is precisely because the
Crown asserted sovereignty over lands previously occupied by Aboriginal
peoples that the Crown in right of the Province is now held to the duty
to consult.28

27

Neskonlith BCCA, supra note 3 at para 64.

28

Neskonlith BCCA, supra note 3 at para 71 [emphasis in original].
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The question about the capacity to consult seems to be answered in the
Neskonlith case itself, as the City of Salmon Arm did take good-faith steps
to engage the First Nation in the process of reviewing the proposal. The
Court of Appeal concluded that, had the City of Salmon Arm been
required to consult, the initiatives it undertook would have satisfied
the duty:
The Neskonlith were treated respectfully by the City and its staff; they
were given copies of all relevant materials; they were heard at various
meetings; their expert reports were obviously reviewed with care by the
owner's experts; and various modifications, including the reduction of the
development to only 20 acres, were made by Shopping Centres to its plans
in the process. 29
Therefore, it can hardly be argued that all municipalities do not have the
appropriate infrastructure. For those who do not have the infrastructure,
however, there must be provincial mechanisms for addressing the gap, such
as provincial legislation requiring local governments in British Columbia to
engage in general community consultations. The Local GovernmentActalso
requires that, in preparing official community plans, a local government
must consider whether consultation is required with First Nations. The
relevant section states:
879. (1) During the development of an official community plan, or the
repeal or amendment of an official community plan, the proposing local
government must provide one or more opportunities it considers
appropriate for consultation with persons, organizations and authorities it
considers will be affected.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the local government must
(a) consider whether the opportunities for consultation with one or more
of the persons, organizations and authorities should be early and ongoing,
and
(b) specifically consider whether consultation is required with

29

Ibid at para 89.
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... (iv) first nations[.]30
Justice Newbury also expressed concern about municipalities having to
engage in an initial strength of claim assessment whenever an Aboriginal
right was affected. It is unclear whether the City ofSalmonArm engaged in
an initial assessment.' In any case, such an assessment would have been
aided by the report describing the First Nation's strong economic ties and
ecological values to their affected traditional territory, which was provided
to the City and the project proponent by the affected First Nation itself.
This makes sense given that the First Nation possesses special indigenous
knowledge and is in the best position to provide evidence of the strength of
their asserted Aboriginal title. The community consultation scheme
provided in the Local GovernmentAct also allowed the City to assess the
strength of the potential adverse effects. Therefore, assessing the strength of
the claim should not pose any concern to a municipality that would likely
be provided the necessary information by the affected parties. This is
consistent with McLachlin C.J.'s statement in Haida that Aboriginal
claimants ought to bring forward and outline their claims by including the
scope and nature of their asserted Aboriginal rights and the
alleged infringements.32
We note that municipalities do engage in consultation on other issues.
The location of social housing in a neigbourhood, the decision to license a
casino, or the creation of a waste disposal site can result in an extensive
process of consultation with citizens that can last for years. In the case of
consultation with Aboriginal people, the Neskonlith case itself shows that a
broad-brush approach to capacity is not appropriate as some, and perhaps
all, municipalities clearly do have the capacity to consult at some level.
In this respect, municipalities are not being asked to do more than the
private sector is already doing in practice. Most mining companies-of all
3

LGA, supra note 6, s 879.

3'

Neskonlith, BCCA, supra note 3 at para 88. The Neskonlith Indian Band took the
position that the City did not conduct an assessment of their claim since it (the City)
believed that municipalities were under no duty to consult. The Court held this was not
determinative and relied on Beckman vLittLeSalmon/CarmacksFirstNation,2010 SCC
53 at para 39, [2010] 3 SCR 103.

32

HaidaNation, supra note 1 at para 36.
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sizes-do consult as part of industry standards for responsible mining
practices. In the initial decision in Wahgoshig, the Court noted that Solid
Gold refused to consult, but that this stance was at odds with the guidelines
set forth by the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada." Part
of the guidelines includes a provision dealing with the consultation of
Indigenous peoples:
In all dealings with communities (see also Principle 5), explorers are
encouraged to:
a. Respect the rights and interests of local communities affected by
exploration activities and the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples and
communities consistent with international human rights standards ...
. Consult with the affected community and appropriate levels of
government to identify strategies to effectively manage the social
consequences of exploration and potential development of a mine[.]14
Principle 5 of the guidelines further stresses the need to engage affected
Indigenous people on the basis that "respect, transparency, consultation and
participation is fundamental to obtaining the social license that underpins
the success of an exploration project". In reality, according to the
guidelines, there are concrete reasons to do so:
Experience has shown that, if there is active engagement with stakeholders
from the earliest stage of exploration and greater accommodation of local
concerns and community participation in decision making, there is a
concomitant decrease in the risk of social conflict.36
In Wahgoshig, Solid Gold raised a concern about being placed in serious
financial jeopardy if it could not continue with its drilling, as it was under
financial pressure caused by the need to maximize tax advantages through

Wahgoshig, supra note 21 at paras 57-59.
The quotes are from a previous version of the Prospector and Developers Association of
Canadas Principlesand Guidance.The current version is worded slightly differently and
can be found online at <http://www.pdac.ca/pdf-viewer?doc=/docs/default-source/e3plus---common/home-principles-and-guidance---full-documnent.pdf> at 24-33,41-50.
3

Ibid.

36

Ibid.
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the use of flow-through shares. Specifically, funds were required to be expended by year-end or significant penalties would be imposed.17 However,
the concerns of speculators seeking a quick profit cannot drive the relationship between Aboriginal people and Canada. We would argue that Haida
Nation requires consultation precisely to prevent the exigencies of shortterm profit speculation in natural resources from damaging relations with
Aboriginal people. To address the types ofproblems raised in the Wahgoshzg
decision, Ontario has taken steps, described below, to require mining companies to work with the province in ensuring that the duty to consult and
accommodate is fulfilled.
2.

IS THERE A DANGER THAT EVERY MINOR ISSUE WOULD
NEED TO BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION, SPAWNING
ENDLESS LITIGATION?

Justice Newbury was concerned that every decision made by a municipality
"ranging from the issuance of business licenses to the designation of parks"
would require consultation." This is indeed an issue, and the Court notes:
Daily life would be seriously bogged down if consultation-including the
required "strength of claim" assessment-became necessary whenever a
right or interest of a First Nation "might be" affected. In the end, I doubt
that it would be in the interests of First Nations, the Crown or the ultimate
goal of reconciliation for the duty to consult to be ground down into such
small particles, obscuring the larger "upstream" objectives described
9
in Haida.3

The Supreme Court of Canada has said that the content of the duty to
consult varies on a spectrum depending on specific circumstances. 4oThis
determination is based on a preliminary assessment of the strength of the
asserted Aboriginal right or title and the seriousness of the potential adverse
effects on such a right.4' At the low end, where the claim is weak or
"
38

3
40
'

Wahgoshig, supra note 21 at para 67.
Neskonlith BCCA, supra note 3 at para 72.
Ibid.
HaidaNation, supra note 1 at para 43.
Ibid at para 39.
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infringement is minor, the Crown may only be required to "give notice,
disclose information, and discuss issues raised in response to the notice"4
but little more. It is only in the case of a strong prima facie claim that a
deeper consultation will be required, aimed at finding interim solutions
with the possibility of accommodation."
Further, not every decision requires consultation. The duty to consult
arises when there is a potential that the contemplated conduct may
adversely affect the asserted right in question." Merely "speculative"
impacts will not trigger consultation.4 Decisions that do not have an
impact on Aboriginal or treaty rights are not the subject of consultation:
"The claimant must show a causal relationship between the proposed
government conduct or decision and a potential for adverse impacts on
pending Aboriginal claims or rights.""
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: USING CONSULTATION

PLANS TO ALLOCATE RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN
THE CROWN AND THIRD PARTIES
We have argued that municipalities and the provincial Crown ought to
work together in the consultation process. We think that the miningsector
can provide an example of how this relationship can be managed. In Ross
River Dena, the Court of Appeal of Yukon suggested that the territory
establish a regime:
In order for the Crown to meet its obligations, it must develop a regime
that provides for consultation commensurate with the nature and strength
of the Aboriginal rights or title claim and with the extent to which
proposed activities may interfere with claimed Aboriginal interests.47
Ontario's new Mining Act provides a useful framework in which to
explore how to better incorporate consultation in municipal legislation.

42

Ibid at para 43.

'

Ibid at paras 44, 47.

4'

Ibidatpara35.
Rio Tinto, supra note 2 at para 46.

46

Ibidatpara45.

47

Ross River Dena, supra note 23 at para 7.
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The new MiningAct not only emphasizes the importance ofconsultation at
the early stages of a project's life, but also clearly stipulates the role and
responsibilities of the provincial Crown and the exploration proponent. If
local governments are to be delegated the duty to consult, it is important

they understand what exactly is being delegated and the role provincial
Crowns' play.
As of 1April 2013, certain early exploration proponents in Ontario are
required to submit an exploration plan as well as apply for an exploration
permit.48 The exploration plan and permit process incorporates the
consultation of Aboriginal peoples throughout. For example, once an
exploration proponent submits their plan and permit application to the
Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, potentially affected
Aboriginal communities are given a copy of the plan and application. The
Aboriginal communities can then submit comments to the Ministrywithin
a prescribed time period. During this period, the proponent can
incorporate comments or make relevant changes. Where permits are being
issued, the Director of Exploration is required to consider whether
consultation has occurred.4 9 This scheme ensures that the Crown remains
responsible for ensuring that consultation has occurred.
In order to apply this scheme to municipalities, legislation could require
that local governments submit project plans to the Ministry, including
plans of consultation with potentially affected Aboriginal communities.
While the Court in Neskonlith was concerned with a municipality's
capacity to consult, programs such as the MiningAct Awareness Program
under the new MiningAct could be implemented. This program ensures
that prospectors have a minimum understanding of the Aboriginal
consultation requirements and the respective roles of each party.so
Under Ontario's new Mining Act both the Ministry and the project
proponent clearly understand their roles and responsibilities. The Ministry
is responsible for: (1) identifying the communities to be consulted, (2) the
'

MiningAct, supra note 5, ss 78.2-78.3. See relevant regulation ExplorationPlans and
ExplorationPermits, 0 Reg 308/12.

49

MiningAct, supra note 5, s 78.3(2)(b).

o See "MiningAct Awareness Program", online: Ministry of Northern Development and
Mines <http://www.mndm.gov.on.ca> for program details.
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scope of consultation and accommodation required, and (3) assessing the
adequacy of consultation and accommodation. The project proponent is
directly responsible for information exchange and discussions, such as
describing the project to affected Aboriginal communities, gathering
information directly from communities on how a project affects them,
discussing with communities ways to minimize risks, and documenting and
reporting to the Ministry."
Asimilar system developed for municipalities will permit the Crown to
calibrate the degree of responsibility based on the municipality involved
and the scope ofconsultation required. If the consultation is at the low end,
where only notice and information are required, there is no reason why a
small municipality could not undertake the task. Where there is deep
consultation required, as was the case in Neskonlith, the provincial Crown
may have to provide greater assistance to smaller municipalities.
We are not suggesting that the Ontario mining regime can be applied
without modifications to consultation involving projects, nor are we
suggesting the balance between the duties of the Crown and the duties of
the proponents is perfect. However, in our view, it does provide a
conceptual framework for establishing a more specific municipal regime.
V.

CONCLUSION
The honour of the Crown lies at the heart of Canada's relationship to
Aboriginal people. It is embedded in Canadian history and permeates the
law today. Sparrowsets out the framework for recognizing and respecting
the rights of Aboriginal people but also the means for infringing those
rights. Infringements are not to be made carelessly and require the Crown
to satisfy conditions that are consistent with the honour of the Crown.
HaidaNation elaborated on the implementation of the Sparrowprinciples
in relation to potential infringements of asserted Aboriginal rights.
In Neskonlith, the British Columbia Court of Appeal was concerned
about the imposition of the duty to consult on municipalities and paved the
way for municipalities to implement projects without consultingAboriginal
"

See "MNDM Policy: Consultation andArrangements withAboriginal Communities at
Early Exploration", online: Ministry of Northern Development and Mines
<http://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/sites/default/files/aboriginal-exploration-consultation
policy.pdf> for further details.
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people. While there are legitimate questions about which entity has the
responsibility for consultation, these concerns should not be addressed by
abridging the right to be consulted. We have proposed an idea that will
retain overall Crown responsibility and a government-to-government
relationship with Aboriginal people, while also delegating appropriate
aspects to those parties with the greatest expertise on the ground. In our
view, this proposal will be more efficient than the alternatives: imposing a
duty to consult directly on municipalities or imposing the entire
responsibility for carrying out the consultation on the Crown.

